| Title: | Network Interconnection With Competitive Transit |
| Authors: | Gilo, David - Recanati Graduate School of Business Adminstration Spiegel, Yossi - Recanati Graduate School of Business Adminstration |
| Keywords: | Interconnection, access pricing, transit, telecommunication, 'billand keep' |
| Issue Date: | 1-Jan-2003 |
| Series/Report no.: | NET Institute Working Paper;03-05 |
| Abstract: | We examine the interaction between two interconnected networks (e.g., two LECs) and a third network (e.g., an IXC) seeking access to their customer base. The IXC could either interconnect with both LECs or interconnect with only one LEC and transit calls to the other LEC via the first LEC's network. We show that there is a wide set of cases in which competitive transit could justify partial or even complete deregulation of access to a network’s customer base. |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2451/28383 |
| Appears in Collections: | NET Institute Working Papers Series |
Files in This Item:
| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GiloSpiegel_03-05.pdf | 702.72 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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